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KUMŪN, *ISTIḤĀLA*, AND *KHALQ*
Three Concepts in Ibn Ḥazm's Cosmology

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Abstract

One of the creation theories in kalām is the theory of latency (*kumūn*). This theory, ascribed to al-Naẓẓām, maintains that all creatures was created at once. There are, however, two different theories of latency in kalām: The comprehensive theory of latency and the limited theory of latency. The main difference between them is while the comprehensive theory affirms the latency for all creatures, the other one restricts it only to limited number of things such as oil in an olive and juice in a grape. Ibn Ḥazm, the famous Ẓāhirī thinker, accepts only the limited theory and rejects the comprehensive one. Therefore he assumes the continuous creation in the universe.

Key Words: Ibn Ḥazm, al-Naẓẓām, theory of latency (*kumūn*), transformation (*istiḥāla*), creation

The kalām's cosmology essentially depends on the theory of atomism which suggests that the world is composed of indivisible parts, *jawāhir*, and accidents inhered in atoms, *aʿrāḍ*. Maintaining this theory, the Muslim theologians attempted both to prove the existence of God and to explain the creation of the universe. In this respect, atomism is also a kind of creation theory.[1] Surely, the great majority of

[1] For the kalām atomism, see Shlomo Pines, *Madhhab al-dharra ʿinda l-Muslimīn* (translated into Arabic by Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Ḥādī Abū Rīda; Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahḍa al-Miṣriyya, 1946). This work could be seen as the first comprehensive study. It deals with the basic concepts, examines the theories about the origins of

Muslim thinkers, especially the theologians hold that the creation is out of nothing. It means that the universe was brought into being in time by the God's command "Be!" But yet there remains a question of how this act of creation took place. The Muslim theologians aimed at providing a theoretical explanation for this phenomenon via atomism. As they see it, God brought things into being, creating the atoms and accidents and afterwards putting them together. Such points as the continuous occurrence of new things in the universe, as the constant changes in the appearance of beings and that only through the sensually observable (hence through the accidents) we can perceive these beings, led the theologians to think that the accidents are continuously recreated. This fact points to one of the main characteristics of creation theory based on atomism: *Continuity*. In this respect, we can say that the kalām's creation theory based on atomism has two main propositions: Creation is out of nothing and is continuous.

Nevertheless, the atomism is not the only natural theory in support of creationism. So, there are some theologians who reject the atomism, though they are not many in number. Amongst them the most prominent one is the Muʿtazilī theologian, al-Naẓẓām (d. 220-230/835-844?). Like the all other theologians, he believes in the creation *ex nihilo*, but explains it through the theory of latency (*kumūn*) in substitution for the atomism. In other words, while the atomist theologians establish the existence of God and the createdness of the world on the basis of atomism, al-Naẓẓām explains them by the the-

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atomism and in addition, gives information about the atomism of Abū Bakr Zakariyyā al-Rāzī (d. 313/925). It includes as an appendix the Arabic translation of the classic article by Otto Pretzl, "Die Frühislamische Atomenlehre." In his *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, Harry A. Wolfson especially examines the relation of kalām atomism to that of Greek, and deals with the anti-atomist approaches (Cambridge, Mass. & London: Harvard University Press, 1976), 466-517. Another study entirely dedicated to the atomism of the Muʿtazila is Alnoor Dhanani's *The Physical Theory of Kalām: Atoms, Space, and Void in Basrian Muʿtazilī Cosmology* (Leiden, New York & Köln: E. J. Brill, 1994). Muḥammad ʿĀbid al-Jābirī's *Binyat al-ʿaql al-ʿArabī* gives information about the fundamentals of the theory of kalām atomism, and analyzes several issues discussed on the ground of it (6th ed., Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-ʿArabiyya, 2000), 175-205, while Richard M. Frank's "Bodies and Atoms: The Ashʿarite Analysis" elaborates the Ashʿarī account of the notions related the theory; in Michael E. Marmura (ed.), *Islamic Theology and Philosophy: Studies in Honor of George F. Hourani* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984), 39-53, 287-293.

ory of latency. So, the theory of latency could be seen as an alternative explanation to atomism.[2]

It should be noted, however, that even if this theory was put as an alternative to atomism, it is far from being accepted by all who rejected atomism. For example, the critical thinker, Ibn Ḥazm is known as a strong opponent of atomism, and he rejects it because of its being incompatible both with the natural phenomena (outward appearance of things, *ẓāhir*) and with religious teachings (the literal/apparent meaning, *ẓāhir*, of religious texts).[3] In addition, alternative explanation models are exposed to his criticism, because his denial of atomism is not to advocate another theory; that is to say, he does not aim to propose another explanation instead of atomism. This article tries to examine Ibn Ḥazm's view about the most important theory, i.e. theory of latency, against atomism, and attempts to present his thoughts on creation. Therefore, it would be appropriate to give a general outline of the theory of latency.

As mentioned above, the theory of latency that was almost identified with the name of al-Naẓẓām, and could be briefly defined as 'the potential existence of some body or quality in another body' points to the creation of beings at one time and as a whole.[4] So, the views ascribed to al-Naẓẓām by ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī (d. 429/1037-38) who gives one of the earlier comprehensive accounts of the theory, are in accordance with the definition of that concept.

> The fourteenth of his [al-Naẓẓām] infamies is his claim that God created men, beasts and other animals, all sorts of plants and minerals at one time. [Therefore] the creation of Adam did not precede that of his

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2 In Islamic thought, a third conception of world developed beside the atomism and the theory of latency is the concept of "matter and form (*hayūlā* and *ṣūra*)" which especially accepted by the Peripatetic philosophers in the Islamic philosophical tradition. This conception that was inherited from Aristotle excludes the creation *ex-nihilo* as it asserts the eternal matter to be the substratum of all that exist. Consequently it was severely repudiated by theologians and could not gain support from them.

3 See Orhan Şener Koloğlu, "İbn Hazm'ın Atomculuğu Reddi [Ibn Ḥazm's Refutation of Atomism]," *Uludağ Üniversitesi İlâhiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* [*The Review of the Faculty of Theology, Uludağ University*] XVI/2 (2007), 169-194.

4 cf. Josef van Ess, *The Flowering of Muslim Theology* (trans. Jane Marie Todd; Cambridge, Mass. & London: Harvard University Press, 2006), 95.

children, as well as the creation of mothers did not precede that of their children. He asserted that God created them all at one time; however, most of beings were in the others [i.e., some of the beings were hidden in the others], so that priority and posteriority are in appearance (*ẓuhūr*) of those things from their places.[5]

The information given by al-Shahrastānī conforms to a great extent to al-Baghdādī's account:

> The eighth [of al-Naẓẓām's views] is that God created all creatures (*mawjūdāt*), either minerals, plants and animals, or men, as they are now and at one time (*dafʿat*^{an} *wāḥidat*^{an}). [Therefore] the creation of Adam was not before that of his descendants. Nevertheless, God has hidden some of them in others (*akmana*), so that priority and posteriority are in appearance (*ẓuhūr*) of those things from their places, not in their creation (*ḥudūth*) and coming into existence (*wujūd*).[6]

These passages that almost duplicate each other present the main points of the theory: Beings were created as they are now, at one time and as a whole. These created beings are hidden in each other and those hidden things come into view when the time is ripe. It should be noted here that extending the theory to include all beings, these accounts point to a comprehensive theory of latency.

It is quite questionable, however, whether the theory could be ascribed to al-Naẓẓām in its above-mentioned form. In one of the earliest sources, *al-Intiṣār* of al-Khayyāṭ, there are almost the same expressions on the theory with al-Baghdādī and al-Shahrastānī.[7] On the

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[5] Abū Manṣūr ʿAbd al-Qāhir ibn Ṭāhir al-Baghdādī, *al-Farq bayna l-firaq* (ed. Muḥammad Muḥyī al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd; Beirut: al-Maktaba al-ʿAṣriyya, 1993), 142.

[6] Abū l-Fatḥ Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Shahrastānī, *al-Milal wa-l-niḥal* (eds. Amīr ʿAlī Mahnā and ʿAlī Ḥasan Fāʿūr; 5th ed., Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifa, 1996), I, 70.

[7] "Then [Ibn al-Rāwandī] said that: [al-Naẓẓām] claimed that God created men, beasts and other animals, non-animal substances (*jamād*) and plants all at one time (*fī waqt*^{in} *wāḥid*^{in}). [Therefore] the creation of Adam did not precede that of his children, as well as the creation of mothers did not precede that of their children. God, however, has hidden (*akmana*) certain things in others, so that priority and posteriority are in appearance (*ẓuhūr*) of those things from their places, not in their creation and production (*khalq wa-ikhtirāʿ*)." See Abū l-Ḥusayn ʿAbd al-Raḥīm ibn Muḥammad al-Khayyāṭ, *Kitāb al-intiṣār wa-l-radd ʿalā Ibn al-*

other hand, al-Khayyāṭ says that this account was based on the information given by Ibn al-Rāwandī, and that what has been ascribed to al-Naẓẓām is a malicious slander. According to him, what al-Naẓẓām suggested was just that "God created the world as a whole."[8] In this respect, al-Khayyāṭ does not agree with al-Baghdādī and al-Shahrastānī in ascribing a comprehensive theory of latency to al-Naẓẓām. The only common point in all these accounts is that "the world was created as a whole." In fact, however, the creation of the world as a whole, means that it was created at one time, as well.[9]

On the other hand, al-Ashʿarī's account is largely consistent with that of al-Khayyāṭ. Without giving a detailed description of latency, he just reports about al-Naẓẓām that he said "oil is hidden in an olive and ointment in a sesame and fire in a stone"[10] and "God created beings at one time."[11]

The information derived from the earliest sources, al-Khayyāṭ and al-Ashʿarī, makes it questionable whether or not al-Naẓẓām held a comprehensive theory of latency as recorded in later sources like al-Baghdādī and al-Shahrastānī. Furthermore, that al-Khayyāṭ describes the comprehensive theory of latency as a slander of Ibn al-Rāwandī, raises doubts about the connection of theory to al-Naẓẓām. Even though the aim of this article is not to discuss to what extent al-Naẓẓām accepted the latency, we should note here that there are not clear texts that justify the assignment of comprehensive theory of

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Rāwandī al-mulḥid (ed. Albert Naṣrī Nādir; Beirut: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Kāthūlīkiyya, 1957), 44.

8 *Ibid.* See also Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, 498-499. The author uses the account of al-Khayyāṭ, but without taking into consideration the distinction made by al-Khayyāṭ between al-Naẓẓām's own words and that of Ibn al-Rāwandī, he ascribes the all statements in the account to al-Naẓẓām through al-Khayyāṭ.

9 See also Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Ḥādī Abū Rīda, *Min shuyūkh al-Muʿtazila Ibrāhīm ibn Sayyār al-Naẓẓām wa-ārāʾuhū l-kalāmiyya al-falsafiyya* (2nd ed., Cairo: Dār al-Nadīm, 1989), 141. He says that the only point the sources agreed upon is the creation of all beings as a whole and at one time.

10 Abū l-Ḥasan ʿAlī ibn Ismāʿīl al-Ashʿarī, *Maqālāt al-Islāmiyyīn wa-khtilāf al-muṣallīn* (ed. Hellmut Ritter; Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1963), II, 329.

11 *Ibid.*, II, 404. He adds here, however, that al-Naẓẓām said "beings are created at every single time (*anna l-jism fī kullⁱ waqtⁱⁿ yukhlaq*).

latency to al-Naẓẓām.[12] However, he was certainly known in Muslim circles as a harsh proponent of theory as a whole.[13]

Although the theory of latency was identified with the name of al-Naẓẓām, it was adopted in different levels by different thinkers. So, according to al-Ashʿarī's account, Ḍirār ibn ʿAmr said: "Of things some are hidden and some are not hidden. As for those which are hidden, they are oil in an olive, and ointment in a sesame and juice in a grape."[14] Al-Ashʿarī reports, too, that Abū l-Hudhayl al-ʿAllāf, Muʿammar ibn ʿAbbād, Hishām ibn al-Ḥakam and Bishr ibn al-Muʿtamir said: "Oil is hidden (*kâmin*) in an olive and ointment in a sesame and fire in a stone."[15] But he goes further and adds, "most of people of speculation (*ahl al-naẓar*) said that fire is hidden in a stone."[16] These remarks of al-Ashʿarī show that the theory was accepted in different levels by such thinkers as Ḍirār ibn ʿAmr who is a strict opponent of the theory[17] and Abū l-Hudhayl al-ʿAllāf who is the initiator of a different conception of world. It is evident from there that two different theories of latency were formulated and recognized in intellectual circles at least in the beginning. One of these is the comprehensive theory of latency that affirms the latency for all creatures and that was ascribed to al-Naẓẓām, and the other is the limited

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[12] Abū Rīda notes that in al-Jāḥiẓ's most comprehensive account about the theory of latency there is no quotation from al-Naẓẓām as he says "the man is hidden in a drop of sperm and the palm in a date-stone." See Abū Rīda, *Min shuyūkh al-Muʿtazila*, 149.

[13] This is probably because of that al-Naẓẓām holds the idea of creation of the world at one time and as a whole. This view that almost all sources agreed upon means, even implicitly, all beings (including the specific examples mentioned by al-Baghdādī and al-Shahrastānī) were created all together. It caused the theory (with its all dimensions) to be identified with the name of al-Naẓẓām in the later period. Consequently the commonly known examples of the comprehensive theory of latency were ascribed to the most prominent proponent of the theory, namely al-Naẓẓām, even if he did not accept them or did not expressed directly.

[14] Al-Ashʿarī, *Maqālāt*, II, 328.

[15] *Ibid*., II, 329.

[16] *Ibid*., II, 328. Al-Ashʿarī mentions by name the Muʿtazilī theologian Abū Jaʿfar al-Iskāfī (d. 240/854).

[17] Especially in al-Jāḥiẓ's *Kitāb al-ḥayawān*, Ḍirār ibn ʿAmr is illustrated as a representative of *aṣḥāb al-aʿrāḍ* and as the leading opponent of the theory of latency; see Abū ʿUthmān ʿAmr ibn Baḥr al-Jāḥiẓ, *Kitāb al-ḥayawān* (ed. ʿAbd al-Salām Muḥammad Hārūn; Beirut: Dār al-Jīl, 1988), V, 10.

theory of latency that was held almost by all prominent thinkers of early kalām.[18] When the first suggests the creation of all beings at one time, the other says that some of beings are composed of elements contradictory to each other and despite this contradiction, those elements would take place in a single body.[19]

When we analyze the examples given for the limited theory of latency, we can see that all are marked by two outstanding characteristics: First, they emerge from other things through some human act, such as squeezing in the case of juice out of a grape or of oil out of an olive and such as striking with a hard object on a stone in the case of fire out of a stone. Second, their presence in the things out of which they emerge is felt even before they are made to emerge by a human act. Thus the presence of the juice in the grape and of the oil in the olive could be felt even before their emergence by the human act of squeezing, and similarly the presence of the fire in the stone could come to be felt by the gradual warming up of the stone by the striking upon it with iron or something like this.[20] As seen, these examples are based on simple observations and consequently are almost necessary to be approved on this empirical basis. In this regard, they inevitably should be accepted.[21]

This point relating to the theory of latency in kalām thought was echoed on Ibn Ḥazm's approach. First of all, we should say that Ibn Ḥazm seems to accept some implications of the theory. Thus, he targets the implacable opponents of the theory, the Ashʿarīs, especially

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[18] The distinction was made by Wolfson and it seems quite accurate. See Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, 501.

[19] M. Ṣāliḥ Muḥammad al-Sayyid, *Abū Jaʿfar al-Iskāfī wa-ārāuhū l-kalāmiyya wa-l-falsafiyya* (Cairo: Dār Qubāʾ, 1998), 154-155.

[20] See Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, 501. These remarks could be seen as true in general. Especially as regards the second characteristic mentioned above, however, there is an uncertainty for the cases of presence of oil in the olive and that of fire in the piece of wood. So, as seen below, according to the opponents of latency, the presence of fire in the piece of wood etc., is quite controversial. Being aware of this, Wolfson notes that the presence of fire is felt by the gradual warming up of the piece of wood or stone.

[21] cf. Josef van Ess, "Kumūn," *Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition*, V, 384. Van Ess refers here to the starting point of the theory as he says "the concept was derived from simple observations."

al-Bāqillānī, and harshly criticizes their view that there is no heat in fire, no cold in snow, no oil in an olive, no juice in a grape and no blood in a man."[22] According to him, among the observable things around us some are hidden such as the blood in a man, juice in a grape and oil in an olive. The evidence for this is that when the hidden things emerge from them the residuals crumple, become smaller and loose weight because of the emergence of what were hidden. Seemingly Ibn Ḥazm accepts the examples proposed as part of the theory of latency. What led him to accept these examples, however, is that they are obviously perceived and indubitably verified by the senses. Thus, it can be seen that when we squeeze the grape the juice comes out from it and that the residue is different from the grape. It would be absurd to deny it in spite of this obvious fact. Ibn Ḥazm regards such a denial as madness and as opposition to reason and sense data,[23] and consequently he accepts the examples of latency verified by the senses.

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[22] Ibn Ḥazm's criticism seems to be accurate, because some of al-Bāqillānī's views could be construed in this way. These views, however, were presented in regard to the issue of *ṭabʿ* (natures of things) rather than being related to the latency. What he tried to prove is that to satiate, to quench thirst, to inebriate, to heat, to chill etc. are not the intrinsic characteristics of beings. According to him, if these were intrinsic characteristics of things due to their natures, there would occur satiation, quenchedness and drunkenness when the other things were eaten or drunk. Likewise, there would be heat and coldness when something came close anything else. Because all things are similar to each other. Therefore if a thing necessarily requires an effect, another thing that is similar to it should necessarily cause to a similar effect. So, when somebody eats pebbles or soil, for example, he should be satiated or when he drinks vinegar he should quench his thirst. Because these are same in kind as the other things which are eaten or drunk; see Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn al-Ṭayyib al-Bāqillānī, *Kitāb al-tambīd* (ed. Richard J. McCarthy; Beirut: al-Maktaba al-Sharqiyya, 1957), 40. Consequently, to assert that burning and inebriety result from the heat of fire and strength of wine is an absolute ignorance and the truth is that these are acts of God (*Ibid*., 43).

[23] Ibn Ḥazm states that the Ashʿarīs have no arguments to support their view beyond saying that God creates heat in the fire and cold in the snow when we touch them, He creates, too, the oil in an olive and the juice in a grape when we squeeze them and creates the blood at the time of cutting or chopping. See Abū Muḥammad ʿAlī ibn Aḥmad Ibn Ḥazm, *al-Faṣl fī l-milal wa-l-ahwāʾ wa-l-niḥal* (Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifa, 1975), V, 63; henceforth *Faṣl*). Certainly Ibn Ḥazm is right in his critique. But although the Ashʿarīs could be criticized in their rejection of visible phenomena, their view seems to be consistent in itself. Because they deny

On the other hand, he considers such kind of latency as compatible with the Qurʾān and refers to some Qurʾānic verses as evidence. One of them is the verse "We said, 'O Fire! Be thou cool, and (a means of) safety for Abraham!". If the fire was not blazing with the heat in it, Ibn Ḥazm says, The God would not give such an order. The another verse is "And from the fruit of the date-palm and the vine, ye get out wholesome drink and food." According to him, this verse denotes that drink and juice are found in those fruits.[24] Consequently, Ibn Ḥazm accepts the theory of latency, even though to some extent, because of its being consistent with the two main basis of his thought, namely the sense data and the apparent or literal (*ẓāhir*) meaning of expressions in the Qurʾān.

Nevertheless, he does not go beyond these examples in terms of latency and does not accept the controversial example of fire in a stone or iron.[25] For him, there is such a power in the flint or steel that when these are compressed, the air within them comes out and is transformed into fire. Likewise, the moisture in all burnable materials is transformed first into fire, then into smoke and eventually into air. There is in the nature of fire, he says, to make to emerge the burnable constituents of things and to evaporate the moisture contained therein, such that the all burnable constituents and the moisture vanish and there remains just noncombustible and nonflammable ash. In this ash, there is neither fire nor moisture to evaporate. Ibn Ḥazm exemplifies this with lamp oil. Lamp oil is quintessentially quite burnable. But when it is ignited by fire, the few liquid elements in it are

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the theory of latency as a whole, they reject all ideas it included. On the other hand it is not possible for them to deny the existence of heat in fire, they had no choice but to say that God creates the heat when we touch the fire.

[24] *Faṣl*, V, 63. Just like Ibn Ḥazm, al-Naẓẓām refers to Qurʾānic verses to prove the latency. Some of them quoted by al-Jāḥiẓ are the verses "See ye the fire which ye kindle? Is it ye who grow the tree which feeds the fire, or do We grow it?" (Q 56:71-72), and "The same Who produces for you fire out of the green tree, when behold, ye kindle therewith (your own fires)!" (Q 36:80). According to al-Naẓẓām, these indicate that fire is hidden in the wood; al-Jāḥiẓ, *Kitāb al-ḥayawān*, V, 92-93.

[25] Beside these two, another common example used in debates is wood. In fact, the question of whether the fire is hidden in the wood or not is a more frequent example than the others. It is strange for Ibn Ḥazm to not refer to the wood while mentioning the stone and iron.

transformed into smoke, then the all burnable constituents come out and in the end the flammability disappears completely.[26]

Because he does not accept this example of latency accepted even by scholars known as the opponents of the theory (like Abū l-Hudhayl al-ʿAllāf, Muʿammar ibn ʿAbbād, Hishām ibn al-Ḥakam, Bishr ibn al-Muʿtamir, and in fact, "most of people of speculation, *ahl al-naẓar*" in al-Ashʿarī's words), of course, it could not be expected from Ibn Ḥazm to approve of more extreme cases of latency. Therefore he does not accept radical examples given to support the theory and which do not limit it to the cases easily perceived by the senses, but extend to every being in the world, such as the occurrence of a stately palm within a small date-stone, and that of a man, perfectly shaped, within a paltry drop of sperm. According to him, to approve such a thing is madness and irrational opposition to sense data. Undoubtedly, a palm emerges into appearance out of date-stone and a man out of a drop of sperm; because God created date-stone and sperm as having this nature. God created in the date-stone the power to absorbe the moisture contained in the water, dung and soil. The date-stone that absorbed the moisture is transformed (*tuḥīl*[t]) into the sapling, leaf, blossom and fruit. Likewise, the created nature of the blood in a drop of seed (*nuṭfa*), is transformed into flesh, blood, bones, nerves, veins, cartilage, skin, nail and hair. All these occur by the creation of God.[27] That is to say, a palm proceeds from the date-stone and a man from sperm, but yet it does not mean the palm or man were already hidden in them. It just indicates that God has created date-stone and sperm as capable of transforming under favorable conditions into palm and man and that He constantly intervenes in this process of transformation by a new act of creation.

Based on what mentioned above, we can categorize the examples of latency under three groups: The first are the simple and limited ones such as the presence of oil in an olive and that of juice in a grape. This kind of latency which is based on simple observations of the senses is accepted by almost all theologians. According to Ibn Ḥazm's account, only the Ashʿarīs (he mentions here al-Bāqillānī by name) do not approve of it. The second are the comprehensive ones

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[26] *Faṣl*, V, 62. See also, Ibn Ḥazm, *al-Uṣūl wa-l-furūʿ* (eds. Muḥammad ʿĀṭif al-ʿIrāqī et al.; Cairo: Dār al-Nahḍa al-ʿArabiyya, 1978), II, 311.

[27] *Faṣl*, V, 62. See also Ibn Ḥazm, *al-Uṣūl wa-l-furūʿ*, II, 311. He gives here only the example of date-stone and palm.

as hiding of man in a drop of sperm and of palm in a date-stone. This form of theory which is strictly opposed by Ibn Ḥazm is only ascribed to al-Naẓẓām and probably is not held by any Muslim theologian except a few followers of him like al-Jāḥiẓ. The third one that stays half way between the other two is the hiding of fire in the firewood, in the stone or iron. This is the most controversial one among the theologians. According to al-Ashʿarī, most of the early theologians, especially the Muʿtazilīs, accepted this kind of latency. Regarding the information provided by Abū Rashīd al-Nīsābūrī and Ibn Mattawayh, in the later period the Muʿtazila of Baṣra approved of this version of theory while the Muʿtazila of Baghdād which was led by Abū l-Qāsim al-Balkhī did not accept it.[28] It seems that was because of it remains between the other two kinds of latency in terms of sensual verification. Namely this neither could be directly experienced through the senses as the first ones nor is almost entirely deprived of the support of sensory perceptions as the second. So, what those who say that the fire is not hidden in the firewood chiefly insist upon is that if the fire were hidden in the firewood it would be felt when someone touch the firewood or would be seen when the firewood is smashed.[29] It explains why some do not accept the hiding of fire in the firewood whereas they approve of the presence of oil in an olive. The presence of oil in an olive is clearly visible, because when we squeeze the olive, oil emerges out of it. When we touch the firewood or stone, on the other hand, we can not feel the fire at that moment.[30]

As can be seen, Ibn Ḥazm only accepts the first version of the latency that was already accepted by most of the theologians, namely

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[28] See Saʿīd ibn Muḥammad Abū Rashīd al-Nīsābūrī, *al-Masāʾil fī l-khilāf bayna l-Baṣriyyīn wa-l-Baghdādiyyīn* (eds. Maʿn Ziyāda and Riḍwān al-Sayyid; Beirut: Maʿhad al-Inmāʾ al-ʿArabī, 1979), 56; Abū Muḥammad al-Ḥasan ibn Aḥmad Ibn Mattawayh al-Najrānī, *al-Tadhkira fī aḥkām al-jawāhir wa-l-aʿrāḍ* (eds. Sāmī Naṣr Luṭf and Fayṣal Budayr ʿAwn; Cairo: Dār al-Thaqāfa li-l-Ṭibāʿa wa-l-Nashr, 1975), 146.

[29] See, for example, Abū Rashīd, *Masāʾil*, 57; Ibn Mattawayh, *Tadhkira*, 146–147. Thus, van Ess says, this is one of three main arguments that was brought forth against the theory. See van Ess, "Kumūn," 385.

[30] It should be remembered here, we have some reservations about Wolfson's view on the issue. As mentioned above, he regards the presence of oil in an olive and that of fire in a stone as similar and puts these two kinds of latency under the same category.

the simple cases which could be verified by the senses such as the presence of oil in an olive and of juice in grape. There is no fire, in his opinion, in a stone or iron, and no palm in a date-stone. The fire and palm, he says, come into existence in consequence of transformation occurred in the matter (stone, iron or date-stone, for example) under specific circumstances. This assertion introduces us with a new concept: *Istiḥāla* (transformation).[31] Technically it means a slow and gradual, not sudden, change in essence or in one of the qualities of something.[32]

As understood from the sources, *istiḥāla* is a term used by those who do not accept the comprehensive theory of latency in order to explain the transformation of bodies.[33] The most debated example of

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[31] Sometimes the term *inqilāb* (change, alteration) is used instead of *istiḥāla*. See, for example, al-Jāḥiẓ, *Kitāb al-ḥayawān*, V, 16; Taqī al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm Ibn Taymiyya, *Majmūʿ fatāwā* (ed. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad al-ʿĀṣimī al-Najdī; Riyāḍ: Matābiʿ al-Riyāḍ, 1381 H.), XVII, 264.

[32] See Abū l-Ḥasan Sayf al-Dīn ʿAlī ibn Muḥammad al-Āmidī, *al-Mubīn fī sharḥ maʿānī alfāẓ al-ḥukamāʾ wa-l-mutakallimīn* (ed. Ḥasan Maḥmūd al-Shāfiʿī; Cairo: Maktabat Wahba, 1993), 100; "*... wa-ammā l-istiḥāla fa-ʿibārat*^{un} *ʿan istibdāl al-shayʾ fī dhātihī aw ṣifat*^{in} *min ṣifātihī lā dafʿat*^{an} *wāḥidat*^{an} *bal yasīr*^{an} *yasīr*^{an}." As seen from the definition, the main emphasis is on the slowness of transformation. So, al-Tahānawī's brief definition supports this point: "[The transformation (*istiḥāla*)] is a gradual transition (*intiqāl*) from one situation to another." See Muḥammad Aʿlā ibn ʿAlī al-Tahānawī, *Kashshāf iṣṭilāḥāt al-funūn* (eds. Mawlawī Muḥammad Wajīh et al.; Calcutta: The Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1862), I, 322. Al-Tabrīzī gives a more simple definition: "The alteration (*taghayyur*) occurred in terms of quality." See Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Abī Bakr al-Tabrīzī, *al-Muqaddimāt al-khams wa-l-ʿishrūn min Dilālat al-ḥāʾirīn* (ed. Muḥammad Zāhid al-Kawtharī; Cairo: al-Maktaba al-Azhariyya li-l-Turāth, 1993), 50. Al-Khwārazmī offers another definition that keeps the emphasize on change: "Something's gaining of a new appearence by giving off its own appearence;" see Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Yūsuf al-Khwārazmī, *Mafātīḥ al-ʿulūm* (ed. Ibrāhīm al-Abyārī; 2nd ed., Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 1989), 161.

[33] Both the terms of *kumūn* and *istiḥāla* implies the emergence of a new being as a result of transformation. The proponents of *kumūn* (who holds the theory of latency) says this new being was already there while the supporters of *istiḥāla* assert that it adventitiously came into being. Thus, the both terms seem to be two different explanations of one same fact. Al-Tahānawī says that who does not accept *istiḥāla*, maintains that the facts which were explained through *istiḥāla* are in fact the examples of *kumūn*. See al-Tahānawī, *Kashshāf*, I, 322.

this term is the presence of fire in a stone or firewood.[34] Those who rejected the hiding of fire in these beings, associates its presence with the air. So, quoting from the words of al-Naẓẓām, al-Jāḥiẓ summarizes the thought of such men called *aṣḥāb al-aʿrāḍ* as follows:

> ... The fire is not hidden in the firewood. How can it be, while the fire is larger than the firewood? But when one piece of wood is rubbed with another the both get considerably heated. Then, the particles of the air surrounding the pieces of wood and, in turn, the air that touches the former gets warm. When completely became heated, this air thins down and consequently flames up. Therefore the fire is transformed air (*hawāʾun istaḥāla*). Because of its quintessence, the air is a matter which is hot, fine, weak, capable to quickly accommodate with anything (*jayyid al-qabūl*), and easy to transform. The fire that seems larger than the wood[35] is just the air which was transformed (*al-hawāʾ al-mustaḥīl*).[36]

As seen, the opponents of latency assign the key role to the air. Because it is an irrefutable fact that when the wood burned fire comes out. Given that the fire was not hidden in the wood, it should be accepted that it came from outside.[37] Because the fire could not be seen before, however, it is necessary to ascribe its existence to something which was already there. This "something" is the air. It becomes heated as a result of certain circumstances (such as rubbing, etc.) and eventually is transformed into fire.

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[34] See, for example, Abū ʿAlī al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbd Allāh Ibn Sīnā, *Kitāb al-najāt fī l-ḥikma al-manṭiqiyya wa-l-ṭabīʿiyya wa-l-ilāhiyya* (ed. Mājid Fakhrī; Beirut: Dār al-Āfāq al-Jadīda, 1985), 183.

[35] The expression "The fire that seems larger than the wood (*wa-l-nār allatī tarāhā aktharᵃ min al-ḥaṭab*)," points to one of the main arguments against the theory of latency. The objection becomes more clear at the beginning of the passage. According to the opponents of *kumūn*, that the theory suggests that something can take place in another one smaller than itself, shows the erroneousness of the theory. As mentioned above, the theory suggests that the fire which is bigger than wood can take place in it. See van Ess, "Kumūn," 385. He considers the objection in question as one of the main three criticisms of the theory.

[36] See al-Jāḥiẓ, *Kitāb al-ḥayawān*, V, 15.

[37] The proponents of *kumūn* do not accept it. According to them, there is no fire that came from outside and acted in wood, stone, etc.; see al-Jāḥiẓ, *Kitāb al-ḥayawān*, V, 20.

Ibn Taymiyya who accepts the concept of *istiḥāla* has a similar approach. According to him, something comes out from two main materials as a result of transformation of another thing between them. When these two things are adjoined to each other there exists another thing between them and the transformation occurs. In this context, the fire comes out from two things adjoined with each other (such as one piece of wood rubbed to another, a stone and iron that was stroke on it, or two flints that are rubbed to each other) as a result of trasformation of matter (the air) between them. When we strike on a stone with iron or rub one piece of wood with another (in the text, the trees of *markh* and *ʿafār*[38]), they lose some of their component particles due to the pressure resulted from striking or rubbing, then some of these lost particles are transformed, the air between the two gets warm and consequently the fire comes out.[39]

As mentioned above, Ibn Ḥazm utilizes the concept of *istiḥāla* to explain the instances given in the latter two categories of latency. As a matter of fact, Ibn Ḥazm approves, in principle, of the presence of transformation in the world. According to him, most things in the

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[38] The trees of *markh* and *ʿafār* are quite common examples used in debates on whether the fire was hidden in the wood or not. See, for example, al-Jāḥiẓ, *Kitāb al-ḥayawān*, V, 82. It is based on the verse Q 36:80: "The same Who produces for you out of the green tree, when behold, ye kindle therewith (your own fires)!" The commentators say that the expression "green tree (*al-shajar al-akhḍar*)" refers to the trees of *markh* and *ʿafār*. See, for example, Abū l-Qāsim Jār Allāh Maḥmūd ibn ʿUmar al-Zamakhsharī, *al-Kashshāf ʿan ḥaqāʿiq ghawāmiḍ al-tanzīl wa-ʿuyūn al-aqāwīl fī wujūh al-taʾwīl* (ed. Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Salām Shāhīn; Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1995), IV, 30; Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Qurṭubī, *al-Jāmiʿ li-aḥkām al-Qurʾān* (Cairo: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 1967), XV, 59-60. Consequently, this verse which enunciates that the fire comes out from the wood (together with the above-mentioned trees) were always put into discussion in some way.

[39] See Ibn Taymiyya, *Majmūʿ fatāwā*, XVII, 264. We should note here, however, Ibn Taymiyya points to a lost material. According to him, the existence of heating air itself is not enough for fire to come out. To transform the air into fire there should be a trigger which is rubbing or striking. The matter that emerged as a result of rubbing (or, in other words, the decreasing material in the rubbed matter because of rubbing) heats up the air and eventually transforms it into fire. Of course, it is not just because of rubbing, namely rubbing is not enough in itself. Both the emerging matter because of rubbing and the air surrounding the bodies which are rubbed together cause the fire to come into existence. See *ibid*., XVII, 261.

world are transformed into each others.[40] The examples in his *Faṣl*, however, which he gives to prove the occurrence of transformation are quite curious. Indeed, the discussion here seems to be taking place in a legal context rather than a theological one. Thus, his main opponents are not theologians or philosophers who accept the comprehensive latency but the Ḥanafīs. He targets at their claims that a small amount of urine or wine in the water is not transformed into water and these are absolutely present in it though they are too small to be perceived by the senses.[41]

Ibn Ḥazm responds to this claim by pointing to the naming of beings by us: The beings around us are different due to dissimilarity of their natures and qualities. Furthermore, their names and definitions differ from each other based on dissimilarity in natures and qualities. For example, water has a nature and characteristic, and whatever possesses this nature and characteristic we call it as "water." If an object does not have the nature and characteristic that makes it "water" it would not be "water" and consequently we would not call it "water." Consequently it is not possible for the water to be present in the wine or honey as it is – by preserving its own definition, nature, and characteristics etc.[42]

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[40] *Faṣl*, V, 64; "*... kull shayʾ fī l-ʿālam fa-aktharuhū yastaḥīl*[u] *baʿḍuhū ilā baʿḍ*[in]".

[41] Ḥanafī jurists expressed their opinions about pureness of water in their juridical books, especially in the chapters on purification (*ṭahāra*). They made differentiation between two kinds of things mixed in water, i.e. between the one which impairs the purity of water and denatures it and the other which does not remove its features. That is another issue of discussion but we can infer from these statements that they hold that anything mixed in water remains there without being transformed into it. See, for example, ʿAbd Allāh ibn Maḥmūd ibn Mawdūd al-Mawṣilī, *al-Ikhtiyār li-taʿlīl al-Mukhtār* (Istanbul: Çağrı Yayınları, 1984), I, 13-16; Abū l-Ḥasan ʿAlī ibn Abī Bakr al-Marghīnānī, *al-Hidāya sharḥ Bidāyat al-mubtadiʾ* (Istanbul: Kahraman Yayınları, 1986), I, 17-21. Therefore the views ascribed to the Ḥanafī jurists by Ibn Ḥazm correspond with what they said. However, Ibn Ḥazm tries to show that these scholars consider such a water as impure in an absolute manner, but it is not true. Because according to the Ḥanafīs a drop of wine fell into one liter of water remains there without being transformed and makes it impure; a drop of wine which fell into sea, on the other hand, remains there without trasforming into water too, but does not contaminate it.

[42] *Faṣl*, V, 64.

In this way, Ibn Ḥazm makes a simple inference against the Ḥanafīs who insist upon the impossibility of transformation. A thing is identical with what we call it; if we call it "water," it is water. So, calling it water means that we confirm the absence of wine in it. If we thought that the wine is present therein then we would not call it "water." That we call it "water" indicates we accept that water has transformed wine into water and it is not present any longer in the water. It also indicates our approval of this transformation. If the wine poured in the water was more than it then wine would transform water into wine. Wine is defined depending on its nature and characteristic and if this definition entirely corresponds with something this is called by what the definition referred to it as: wine.

According to Ibn Ḥazm the transformation of natural beings occurs in favor of the dominant ones. Therefore he puts the general principle that when two things meet, the dominant one forces the other to transform. For example, air transforms water into air (he means evaporation). But when the air transformed from the water comes to a larger amount the transformation process is reversed and the air is transformed into water (rain). All these are demonstrated by the senses and reason (*awāʾil al-ʿuqūl wa-l-ḥawāss*), and to oppose them would be going beyond the limits of reason.[43]

We should notice, however, that Ibn Ḥazm do not think here in a theological way, moreover that perhaps he could not perceive the concept of transformation discussed in the natural philosophy of kalām. This is implied by his dealing with the issue rather in a legal context. As seen in the examples of latency given above one thing is totally transformed into another such as the transformation of air into fire. Before the air has been transformed into fire there was no fire but just air. Air is transformed into fire under certain circumstances, fire comes out and then air completely disappears. As for the examples of Ibn Ḥazm, there exist two different elements together and the dominant one of them causes the other to transform. Due to its presence in a larger amount in the mixture, water predominates over the drop of wine and transforms it.[44] Therefore the examples given by Ibn

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[43] *Ibid*.

[44] The other examples given by Ibn Ḥazm against the Ḥanafīs proceed in the same way. For example, chicken eats carrion and blood, and ram drinks wine. But all these (i.e. carrion, blood, wine, etc.) lost their natures and were transformed into chicken and mutton. Therefore the Ḥanafīs accept the chicken and mutton as *ḥa-*

Ḥazm to prove the occurrence of transformation do not conform to the commonly given examples for latency. In spite of this, however, he clearly accepts the occurrence of transformation in the nature and explains by transformation most of events explained by the exponents of latency through the latency.

It is no doubt that his approval of some examples of latency (such as the presence of oil in an olive) while he rejected the others (such as the hiding of palm in a date-stone) is based on his taking the observable facts into consideration. We clearly see the presence of oil in an olive, moreover we squeeze it to remove its oil. These are irrefutable facts. On the other hand, the hiding of palm in a date-stone could not be verified by the senses. The most we can say that the date-stone would be transformed into a palm in advance. Consequently, the approval of some examples of latency by Ibn Ḥazm is based on that these examples conform with the data he derived through the observable facts, rather than being based on that he accepted the theory of latency, even if partially. That he included in his system the concept of transformation which is persistently avoided by the exponents of latency shows that he remained distant from this theory.

Ibn Ḥazm fiercely opposes the most important premise of the theory, namely of that two different bodies could be present in the same place at the same time (*mudākhala*).[45] Every body has a place as wide as its extension. If another body is added on it, there would be need to a place as wide as the extent of the added body. Therefore it is not possible to say that two different bodies could be in the same

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lāl. This acceptance means that the nature of chicken or ram transforms what they eat or drink. If chicken and ram excessively ate or drank these things, their nature would become insufficient to transform them and these impure things would become dominant in their natures. Then eating them would be *ḥarām*. Likewise the legume and fruits absorb the impure materials from the soil, but transform them, and they become *ḥalāl*. See *ibid*.

It is to be noted here that such examples of transformation (*istiḥāla*) has not been used only by Ibn Ḥazm. Al-Khwārazmī, for example, considers the transformation of what ram eats into mutton as an example of *istiḥāla*; see al-Khwārazmī, *Mafātīḥ al-ʿulūm*, 161.

[45] That is one of the main criticisms against the theory from both the Sunnī and Muʿtazilī theologians. According to them, besides its other fallacies, the theory of latency is faulty because of that it requires the presence of two different bodies in same place at the same time.

place at the same time, unless there is a new space with the same width as the added body. Just as a single body could not be in two different places at the same time, so two different bodies could not be present in the same place at the same time.[46] In this way Ibn Ḥazm rejects one of the main propositions that justifies the theory of latency.

Accordingly, the acceptance of the examples of latency by Ibn Ḥazm (and some other theologians) does not refer to the approval of such conception of world by them. Although they accepted these examples they did not base a theory of universe upon them. They accepted them because to observe these visible facts forced those theologians to accept.

Now we can go on to examine the views of Ibn Ḥazm on creation and to compare them with those of al-Naẓẓām. We have already mentioned above that ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī said that al-Naẓẓām asserted the creation of beings at one time (*fī waqt*^{in} *wāḥid*^{in}) while al-Shahrastānī refers to this notion by the term *dafʿat*^{an} *wāḥidat*^{an}. These statements show that he considered the creation as an act occurred at one time and all at once. This opinion completely complies with the theory of latency.

We have also mentioned, on the other hand, that in parallel with the accounts of al-Baghdādī and al-Shahrastānī, al-Ashʿarī says that al-Naẓẓām accepted the creation of things both at one time and at every time. Thus al-Ashʿarī's account contains, at first sight, two paradoxical statements: The creation of beings at one time and the continuity of creation at every time. In al-Khayyāṭ, we can find a similar account that emphasizes the continuity of creation. He states that al-Naẓẓām said the world was created as a whole. Then he adds quoting Ibn al-Rāwandī as saying "al-Naẓẓām believes that God creates the world and everything in it at every time and at every point without annihilating them and constantly renews the creation." Al-Khayyāṭ does not accept, however, this report as true. He records that this opinion was

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[46] *Faṣl*, V, 61. Ibn Ḥazm states that two bodies could not exist together by way of *mudākhala*, but only by way of *mujāwara* (to be in two places side by side). According to him, *mudākhala* can take place between an accident and a body or between an accident and another one. Because the accidents do not occupy space. Accordingly, the accidents such as the color, taste, heat, cold or rest could inhere in bodies as well as they could interpenetrate to each other. See *Faṣl*, V, 61, 86.

ascribed to al-Naẓẓām by al-Jāḥiẓ, and nobody made such an assertion except him; moreover followers of al-Naẓẓām insisted upon that he did not hold such a view.[47] Considering al-Khayyāṭ's denial of this assertion there do not remain any contradictory statements.

Even if we assume that the both reports narrated by al-Ashʿarī are true, yet these are possible to be reconciled. So the creation of being at one time could be regarded as latency (*kumūn*) when the continuity of creation at every time could be regarded as appearance (*ẓuhūr*). According to this, the beings were created at one time but their appearance from their places in which they were created and were hidden, when the time is ripe, was possibly perceived as the continuity of creation.[48] Consequently, because we accept that al-Naẓẓām believed in the latency and creation of beings at one time it would be appropriate to construe the information about the continuity of creation as indicating the second part of the theory, namely appearance (*ẓuhūr*).

As he denied the theory of latency, naturally Ibn Ḥazm did not consider the creation as an act occurred at one time. To him, the creation is continuous as he explains as follows: God's creating something means to bring it to existence out of non-existence, i.e. to generate (produce, *ījād*). So, as long as it continues to exist, it is created by God. To say that God is not creating/is continuing to create something that exists now means that it is existent but God is no more the creator of it. God constantly creates anything that exists in every time unless He annihilated it.[49] It seems here that Ibn Ḥazm regards the endurance of a being in existence as the continuous creation of it by God. The existence of beings is bound to be created by God, and consequently their endurance in existence refers to the continuity of creation.

The discussion is related, at least in the eye of Ibn Ḥazm, to debates on "creation and what is created," namely to that of whether the creation is identical with what is created or not. Ibn Ḥazm regards the

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[47] See al-Khayyāṭ, *Kitāb al-intiṣār*, 44.

[48] cf. Husam Muhi Eldin al-Alousi, *The Problem of Creation in Islamic Thought: Qurʾān, Hadīth, Commentaries, and Kalām* (Cambridge: The National Printing and Publishing Co., 1965), 288.

[49] See *Faṣl*, V, 55.

two as identical. It means the creation is not other than what is created.[50] Because of the created thing is identical with the creation, the creation will continue to occur as long as the created being exists, and consequently the creation will be continuous.[51] In Ibn Ḥazm's remarks at the beginning of the chapter on the continuity of creation we can find a hint to his view about the issue, as he says "when we have demonstrated that the creation of anything is identical with it (*inna khalq al-shayʾ huwa l-shayʾ nafsuhū*) and that God's creating anything will continue to occur as long as this being exists ..."[52]

Another point that led him to this idea, on the other hand, is the principle of literal reading of the Scripture on which his system is based. In this context he refers as a proof to the verse "It is We Who created you and gave you shape; then We bade the angels bow down to Adam ..." According to him, this verse indicates that God created the soil and water, then Adam and his sons were nourished by what was transformed from the soil and water (*bi-mā istaḥāla ʿanhumā*), consequently blood came into being as a transformed product of soil and water. At the end, God transformed (*aḥāla*) this blood into semen. Additionally he refers to the verses "... then We developed out of it another creature (man, *khalq*^{an} *ākhar*^{a})." and "He makes you, in the wombs of your mothers, in stages, one after another, (*khalq*^{an} *min baʿd khalq*^{in}) in three veils of darkness." All these verses show, he says, that in every time God makes transformations in His creatures.[53]

As seen, based on the concept of transformation (*istiḥāla*), Ibn Ḥazm tries to show that beings are in a continuous change process. He interprets the transformation of beings as the continuity of creation. According to this, the being is recreated by God without being annihilated. That is what he calls "new creation (*khalq jadīd*)."[54]

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[50] See *Faṣl*, V, 40.

[51] See also Duncan Black Macdonald, "Continuous re-Creation and Atomic Time in Muslim Scholastic Theology," *Isis* 9 (1927), 338.

[52] See *Faṣl*, V, 55.

[53] *Ibid*.

[54] *Ibid*. The notion is mentioned in the Qurʾān: "They say 'What! When we are reduced to bones and dust, should we really be raised up (to be) a new creation (*khalq*^{an} *jadīd*^{an})?" (Q 17:49 and also 98).

We should point here to Ibn Ḥazm's view about al-Naẓẓām's idea of creation. He notes that al-Naẓẓām said God created everything He created at one time without annihilating it and that his view was criticized by some theologians who were not enumerated by name by Ibn Ḥazm.[55] Ibn Ḥazm regards this statement as true, but although he approved of al-Naẓẓām's opinion, it does not mean that Ibn Ḥazm thinks theoretically in the same way as al-Naẓẓām on the issue of creation. So, as mentioned above he does not agree with al-Naẓẓām on latency.[56]

The point we should think over is the statement "to create something without annihilating it." What does it mean? One of the possible answers is that it refers to the creation theories in classical Islamic theology. Therefore we should briefly mention these theories.

Summarizing these theories, Alousi categorizes them under two main titles: i) Theories of continuous creation ii) Theories of continuous re-creation. According to him, the principal points that differ them from each other are the endurance of the accidents and the acceptance of natural laws of causality. The main representatives of the theory of continuous creation are the Muʿtazilīs who assert the endurance of the accidents and accept the operation of natural laws of causality in beings while those of the other theory are the Ashʿarīs who deny the endurance of accidents and natural causality.[57]

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[55] See *Faṣl*, V, 54.

[56] We should note here that the view ascribed by Ibn Ḥazm to al-Naẓẓām is to be treated by caution. Because, as already mentioned, al-Khayyāṭ does not accept this report as true and moreover he says that this opinion was ascribed to al-Naẓẓām by Ibn al-Rāwandī and nobody agreed with him on such an assertion except al-Jāḥiẓ.

[57] For more information see al-Alousi, *The Problem of Creation*, 278-297. When classifying these theories, the author is not based on whether the existence of atoms was accepted or not. Consequently, the Muʿtazilīs who accept the existence of atoms, such theologians who deny it as al-Naẓẓām and Hishām ibn al-Ḥakam, and a Muslim philosopher, al-Kindī, who rejected atomism and held the concept of "matter and form" are categorized by him as the adherents of the same theory, namely that of continuous creation. He just says that "the main distinction between them being the belief of one group in the idea of the atom, and its rejection by the other." On the other hand, he regards the Ashʿarīs who hold the idea

The point here is the endurance of accidents. Accordingly the question is whether the accidents, namely the visible characteristics of things, could remain to exist on the substance when they were created once. Or, are these annihilated and then created again (recreated)? According to the first trend, i.e. the Muʿtazilīs, the accidents have endurance except the ones that are not possible to endure due to their nature. It means when an accident was created once in a substrate it remains to exist in there. It is annihilated only when its contrary is created. And according to the other trend, namely the Ashʿarīs (and besides them the Māturīdīs), the accidents do not have endurance. When the accident was created it does not remain at rest more than an instant and is immediately annihilated. God recreates that accident, however, in the same substrate and it goes on in this manner (*tajaddud al-amthāl*, literally, the regeneration of the similars). Thus the proponents of the second trend believe, in opposition to the Muʿtazilīs, that the accidents are continuously recreated by God rather than being created once.[58]

That is what gives us the reason why they held different creation theories. Because the accidents are continuously annihilated and recreated in the view of the Ashʿarīs we can call their theory as "the theory of continuous recreation." As they believe in the endurance of the accidents, on the other hand, the Muʿtazilīs need not to accept the continuous recreation. Consequently, with respect to the existence of the accidents, the world is continuously annihilated and recreated in the view of the Ashʿarīs. According to the Muʿtazilīs, it is not annihi-

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of atom just like much of the Muʿtazilīs as the adherents of the theory of continuous re-creation.

See for another brief analysis of the views on creation in terms of these theories, Pines, *Madhhab al-dharra*, 33-34.

[58] As al-Alousi pointed out, the different approaches of the schools to the issue of causality partly shaped their views on the endurance of accidents. So because the Ashʿarīs rejected the natural causality and accepted the absolute intervention of God, they came to the opinion that the accidents should be created by God in every time. On the other hand, because they accept the natural causality to some extent, the Muʿtazilīs said that an accident could endure to exist. Therefore, we can consider the endurance of accidents as the basis for the classification of these approaches.

lated and when it once was brought into existence it remains to exist until it is annihilated by God.[59]

So, it could be said that the statement which was ascribed to al-Naẓẓām by Ibn Ḥazm, that "God created everything that He created at one time without annihilating it," refers to the endurance of accidents. Of course, it is quite possible that "some theologians" who criticized al-Naẓẓām and who were not enumerated by name by Ibn Ḥazm are the Ashʿarīs who do not approve of the endurance of accidents. To verify this judgment, however, it should be proved that al-Naẓẓām accepted the endurance of accidents; but it is quite controversial. M. A. Abū Rīda says, for example, that al-Naẓẓām does not accept such endurance.[60] Moreover, when he summarizes the views of theologians on the endurance of accidents, al-Ashʿarī does not mention al-Naẓẓām by name among who denied the endurance of accidents but puts him under a distinct category. According to this, al-Naẓẓām accepts only one accident, *movement*, and he asserts that it does not

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[59] The difference between these two approaches to the issue of creation is explained in relation to the qualities of accidents. Accordingly, that the accidents do not have endurance and that they are re-created at every time is the starting point of the idea of continuous re-creation. This idea seems to be consistent in itself. As the accidents are constanly re-created, the creation becomes a continuous act. As for the other way of explanation, namely that of continuous creation, there is not the idea of re-creation of the accidents, on the contrary the accident remains in existence as it was created once. Consequently, at first sight it comes to mind that as if the creation was over and done with, because there is nothing which is continuously re-created.

Such an impression is essentially caused by looking at the issue from the perspective of the endurance of accidents. It should be remembered here, however, that the atomist view supposes the continuousness of creation. Because at every time something is created in the world and these created beings are composed of atoms and accidents. Therefore, the term of continuous creation should be dealt with in a more comprehensive manner. The term of continuous re-creation is applied to more specific examples in the scope of continuous creation. Namely it specifically refers to the continuous re-creation of some components of created beings, i.e. that of accidents. This particular emphasis distinguishes it from the more general idea of continuous creation. In this regard, the concept of the continuous recreation denotes a special approach under the concept of the continuous creation.

[60] See Abū Rīda, *Min shuyūkh al-Muʿtazila*, 117-118.

have endurance.[61] Therefore, the problem lies at the very core of the issue. Al-Naẓẓām does not regard as accident much of what are considered as accidents by other theologians. So, the explanation seems quite problematic as it attempts to explain a conception of world through the notions that belong to another conception. Furthermore, the only accident whose presence was accepted by al-Naẓẓām does not have endurance. Even if this explanation were approved in spite of potential inconsistencies and difficulties included in it, this just indicates that al-Naẓẓām thinks in a different way from the Ashʿarīs, not that he shares the same point with Ibn Ḥazm.

Another possible explanation is that the opinion ascribed to al-Naẓẓām refers direcly to the theory of latency and it seems to be a more reasonable solution. Because the main thesis of the theory, i.e. the creation of beings at one time, implicitly means that these are not annihilated.[62] Seemingly, Ibn Ḥazm took into consideration only the part of the theory that is compatible with his views, not the whole. Consequently, that Ibn Ḥazm regards the view of al-Naẓẓām as true does not mean there is an absolute agreement between the two. At first sight, their views seem to be literally the same as the other: The thing is created without being annihilated. But they reach the same conclusion from different starting points, in other words, from different views on creation. al-Naẓẓām's conclusion is based on the connotations of the theory of latency while that of Ibn Ḥazm is based on the visible appearance of beings and on the presupposition that God continuously intervenes in the world through His power. As seen, Ibn Ḥazm approves the view of al-Naẓẓām just considering the similarity in conclusions reached without paying attention to its theoretical background or without comprehending it completely.

As a conclusion, we can say that although he accepted some examples given in support of the theory of latency, Ibn Ḥazm does not regard it as a theory of nature. This approval does not mean more than that he found these examples compatible with his methodology

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61 See al-Ashʿarī, *Maqālāt*, II, 358; see also ʿAḍud al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Aḥmad al-Ījī, *al-Mawāqif fī ʿilm al-kalām* (Cairo: Maktabat al-Mutanabbī, n.d.), 101. He mentions here al-Naẓẓām together with Abū l-Qāsim al-Balkhī who was referred by al-Ashʿarī as one who absolutely rejects the endurance of accidents.

62 Accordingly al-Alousi refers to the theory of latency as a separate trend among the theories of continuous creation. See al-Alousi, *The Problem of Creation*, 283 ff.

which is based on the visible facts (i.e. visible appearance of beings). Accordingly he rejects the theory of latency just as he did regarding atomism. So, he explains the creation neither within the frame of these theories nor through their concepts. Certainly he thinks that the creation is continuous and in this respect he is in agreement with many of the creation theories offered by different conceptions of world. This agreement, however, is only on the literal level and includes no similarity in terms of theoretical background.

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